The recent case of Nathadwarawala v GMC (28 Feb) serves to outline how an unsigned appeal notice is likely to be dealt with by the Court.

It also provides a helpful reminder as to the limited circumstances in which the Court may exercise its discretion to extend time to appeal.

The Appellant doctor had submitted an Appellant’s Notice, and paid the relevant court fee, a few days before the 28-day period expired but the form had not been signed.

By the time the error was pointed out to the Appellant by the Court, the appeal period had elapsed.

The GMC raised an objection asserting that the appeal had not been brought within the statutory 28-day period.

As to whether submission of the unsigned Appellant’s Notice, and payment of the fee, within the appeal period was sufficient to ‘constitute the bringing of an appeal’ (para 4), the Court determined that it was not, stating:

“the omission of a signature is itself a significant omission vitiating the validity of an otherwise completed Form N161 as constituting a valid appeal”… The affixing of a signature, by whatever method, indicates that the form has been completed (i.e. it is no longer a working draft) and confirms the information stated in the form” (para 19).

As to whether the Court had a discretionary power to enable the omission to be remedied, the Court concluded:

”[the Appellant’s] failure to submit a signed Form…..constituted a failure to comply with a requirement laid down in a statute, not merely a requirement set out in the CPR . CPR r.3.10 cannot come to the rescue in such a situation…”. (para 25)

As to whether, the Court had the power to extend time, the Court concluded it did not have such discretion in the circumstances stating:

• “denying a power to extend time would not impair the very essence of the Appellant’s right of appeal” (para 37)
• “There is… a need for clarity and certainty as to whether, and when, an appeal has been brought” (para 37).
• “A litigant in person who claims to have been unsure about court procedures, but leaves it until close to the end of the appeal period before first attempting to submit an appeal is taking a risk of being ‘timed out’ in the event that a deficiency with its appeal submission is identified. The fact that the Appellant chose to run that risk, and was then caught out by it, does not support a conclusion that the essence of his right to appeal has been impaired”(para 37).

This judgment will almost certainly be of interest to both regulators and healthcare professionals – it is well worth a read – a copy of the judgment can be found here: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/459.html